4 Views of Divine Foreknowledge: Simple-Foreknowledge

Just to recap, this past Spring I read a book called Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views by James Beilby. If you are interested in purchasing this, you can do so on Amazon.com. This is a comparison of four views of God's foreknowledge from different scholars. What do we mean by God's foreknowledge? We mean what does God know and when does He know it. My last post, I summarized Gregory Boyd's view of God's foreknowledge: open theism. Check it out here. This week I will look at the simple-foreknowledge view, which is described by David Hunt. I will refrain from commentary until then last addition. Let me reiterate, I am not claiming which of these is my view, but rather a concise summary of the authors explanation and view of these opinions on God's foreknowledge. 

The Simple-Foreknowledge View by David Hunt

A general affirmation among Christians is that God is omniscient. God therefore knows all truths. His very nature is all-knowing, therefore without mistakes. All-knowing refers to the past, present and future, therefore complete. There are three general issues raised against the doctrine of divine foreknowledge (F).[1] These are “the Problem of Human Freedom, the Problem of Divine Agency, and the Problem of Divine Providence.”[2] Two Christian responses to these issues are diminished foreknowledge and augmented foreknowledge. Hunt rejects these and offers simple foreknowledge. This describes a specific means through which God sees the future. Hunt does not know specifically how God knows it; regardless God does know it.[3]

The Case for Divine Foreknowledge

There are four points that provide support for (F). First, there is substantial biblical proof.[4] Second, because God is perfect (F) is required. Third, divine sovereignty and providence require God’s complete knowledge and power. Last, the majority of Church scholars defend (F).[5]

The Problem of Human Freedom

The problem is:

1. (1)   If God foreknows that Adam will sin, then it’s necessary that Adam will sin.
2. (2)   If it’s necessary that Adam will sin, then Adam will not sin of his own free will.[6]

Therefore, if (F) is true, no one does anything of their own free will. This is troubling for many Christians, so they believe this:

1. (3)   God foreknows Adam that Adam will sin.
2. (4)   Adam will sin of his own free will.[7]

The challenge is to find a theologically accepted method to deny (1), (2), (3) or (4). One response is accidental necessity. “Conditions that are not themselves necessary may, once those conditions are in place limit what else is possible.”[8] Another response is Boethian. This purports that God knows everything that is future relative to us as an all-inclusive current knowledge to Him. It denies (3) while keeping (F).[9] The third response is the Ockhamist solution. This revolves around God’s belief in a future event being a soft fact until it actually happens.[10] The last response is Augustinian solution. This is “if God causes, forces or coerces Adam to sin, Adam would indeed be blameless; but God’s merely foreknowing what Adam will do does not cause, force or coerce him.”[11] As a result of wresting with these views, Hunt rejects (2).

The Problem of Divine Agency

Since God foreknows all things, His own actions are included. So if He knows what He will do, it would follow He could not acquire the intention to do so.[12] “What makes God or anyone an agent is the power to decide what to do? God’s omniscience does not deprive him of this power, since it determines only his propositional beliefs, leaving his practical beliefs--the ones relevant to agency—wide open.”[13]

The Problem of Divine Providence

The basic problem is “(i) God cannot put his foreknowledge to use without generating an explanatory circle and (ii) such circles are impossible.”[14] This is a real challenge. First, it is more problematic than the first two. Second, simple foreknowledge provides God with no providential advantage.[15]

In sum, it is the clarifying rather than the progressive order that is essential to agency. God’s knowledge of future events does not change the free will of the agent’s choice.

In my next post I'll summarize the middle-knowledge view as presented by William Lane Craig. 

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[1] Ibid, 65-66.

[2] Ibid, 66.

[3] Ibid, 66-68.

[4] Isaiah 41:22-23; 46:9-10, Genesis 40, Matthew 26, Psalm 139:4. 

[5] Ibid, 69.

[6] Ibid, 73.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid, 75.

[9] Ibid, 78-79.

[10] Ibid, 82-86.

[11] Ibid, 88.

[12] Ibid, 91-94.

[13] Ibid, 95-96.

[14] Ibid, 97.

[15] Ibid, 97-101.